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Economic Crisis and Security Threats
“The global recession is America’s primary near-term security 
concern.” 
Admiral Blair – Director of National Intelligence
(February 2009)
“The single biggest threat to national security is the national 
debt.”
Admiral Mullen, Chairman of the  Joint Chiefs of Staff
(August 2010)
“I have to confess, I paid no attention to this (economics) as a 
cadet and have done nothing to increase my awareness of 
economics issues between age 22 and 59.  I should have 
paid attention.”
General Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(October 2011)
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The World Economic Crisis
With regard to the ongoing economic crisis, several 
generalizations are possible:
• The current crisis while severe, shares many 
characteristics and patterns associated with past crisis
• Its origins and underlying causes follow a familiar 
pattern --- with several unique twists
• Just when it appeared the crisis was coming to an end 
in 2010, it has flared up again with the prospects for 
the next several years, grim for the developed market 
economies (DMs) and highly uncertain for the 




• Long period of easy credit, low interest rates
• The trigger:
• Higher than expected defaults on U.S. subprime mortgage loans 
(bad banking?)
• The propagation channel:
• From real estate markets 
• to asset-backed securities markets 
• to bank balance sheets 
• to inter-bank funding markets 
• to the broader credit markets 




The early stages of the crisis :
• Summer 2007 – initial phase
• Subprime mortgage crisis, 
• Beginning of collapse of stock exchange
• Early 2008 – growing stress in advanced countries
• Systemic crisis of financial intuitions in US
• Economic slowing down in U.S. EU and Japan, but
• Overheating inmost emerging markets (high commodity prices, 
weak US dollar accelerating inflation 
• Summer 2008 – breaking point
• Bursting commodity and other bubbles
• Global crisis of financial institutions (bankruptcy of Lehman)
• Recession in developed countries
• Fall 2008 – crisis hits emerging market economies.
• Effects of the crisis world-wide and more severe than in past 
modern recessions – severe because of wide-spread financial 
institution’s holding of bad paper. 7
Crisis: Country Responses
• Not much coordinated activity in responding to crisis, 
because of incompatible conceptual frameworks for 
understanding its root causes
• U.S. policy makers believe that trade surplus countries pursued 
policies that created global imbalances – excess savings in 
China – fixed exchange rate
• Europeans believed that the root cause of the crisis was 
excessively deregulated financial systems
• China feels reserve status of dollar created the imbalances to 
develop to unsustainable levels
• Therefore responses not coordinated
• Fiscal stimulus in some countries
• Expansive monetary policy, central bank asset purchases
• Support (IMF) to vulnerable countries
• Attempts through WTO at preempting protectionism 8
Crisis: Transmission  and Responses
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Four Early Economic/Security Scenarios
In late 2008, early 2009 four economic crisis/security 
scenarios were getting considerable attention –
• The Bait Effect – terrorists seeing the U.S. economy melting 
down calculate that a strike could have a force multiplier 
because of the already skittish stock market.
• The China Syndrome – Chinese own more than $500 billion 
in US. Treasury bonds, and billions more in other U.S. debt.  
While they would not dump them on the market to disrupt 
the U.S. economy, they have leverage over U.S. decisions on 
interest rates, exchange rate decisions.
• A Japanese “Lost Decade” – U.S. economy flat in the water 
for a decade or so – government runs up debt with no 
stimulating effect on the economy
• The Alternative-Dollar Nightmare – countries refuse to hold 
dollar reserves.  Dollar crashes and U.S economy along with 
it.
• None happened – Lesson – Much More Stability in Global 
System than Commonly Believed 10
Global Financial Crisis: Initial Security Concerns
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Factors Contributing to Stability
Why didn’t the global system collapse when many in late 2008 were 
predicting its immediate demise?
• Revival did not happen because markets managed to stabilize 
themselves on their own
• Governments learning from the great depression responded quickly 
through central banks and treasuries
• The extensive social safety nets across the industrialized world 
cushioned the pain
• Global system is simply more resilient than we imagined – three 
major reinforcing elements  producing stability
• Spread of great power peace – relatively little friction between major 
nations – rare in history – true global economy
• Relatively low rates of inflation – can plan for the future 
• Technological connectivity – information revolution crated a deeply 
connected global system – most nations have benefitted greatly from 
the system – cautious about appeals to nationalism or acts that would 




Crisis: Potential U.S. Growth
Under all the standard scenarios, the crisis will have a 
marked impact on U.S. potential growth:
• The recession, the rising U.S. debt levels and tighter 
financial conditions will hurt investment, keeping 
capital formation well below rates in pre-crisis years
• Resulting high and more-persistent-than-usual unemployment 
will lower potential growth
IMF estimates that U..S. potential output will average about •
1.5% over the next five years. 
• This compares with an estimated 2.0 percent anticipated 
average in the absence of the crisis
• By 2014 the potential output expected to be abut 6 percent 
below what it would have been in the absence of a  crisis
• Slower U.S. growth will suppress recoveries in key 
U.S. trading partners.
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Crisis Has Accelerated Changes in World GDP
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Debt Burden and Credit Ratings 
18
2011 -- Increased Pessimism
Since early 2011 most forecasting groups have continually 
downgraded their projected rates of recovery for most 
areas of the world.  Many factors are involved:
• A lack of resolution of old threats to the recovery (e.g., the 
EZ crisis)
• The need for deleveraging in DM public sectors
• The double dip in the U.S. housing sector, witch poses risks 
to wealth, personal consumption, and the balance sheets of 
financial institutions
• Still-high commodity prices that have dampened 
consumption and complicated monetary policy in some 
countries
• Inadequate rebalancing of global demand, adding to excess 
capacity
• Rising risks of a short-term hit to confidence – markets very 
nervous
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Near-Term Leading Indicators All Down
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Measures of Global Risk Aversion Up Sharply 2011
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IMF October 2011 Forecast I
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IMF October 2011 Forecast II
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IMF October 2011 Forecast III
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Commodity Price Changes: April vs. October 2011
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What Has Changed? 
Downside risks dominate in DMs
• The lingering EZ periphery debt crisis and a major political 
economy problem preventing its solution have returned to 
the fore
• The U.S. at stall speed with still high consumer debt implies 
the need for stimulus, but political issues and the debt 
downgrade have contributed to policies that accentuate 
unnecessary and harmful fiscal drag
• Even as temporary shocks (Japan supply-chain disruptions, 
oil price spike) wane, underlying growth is weak.  
• Net effect since June:
• Weak DM performance greatly reduces chance of strong global growth
• DM weakness puts greater pressure on China/EMs.  It raises the risk of 
a crash rather than a slow burn.
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Fear Factor
These elements combine to create a fear factor that is 
depressing world-wide expectations for growth.
• Sequencing matters – falling commodity prices are not yet 
benefitting consumers, but are already curbing growth and 
financial flows in producer economies
• The Gulf States, Russia and Brazil will growth this year but not at peak 
rates, 
• Other BRIC countries are also experiencing difficulties
• India, still struggling to contain near double-digit inflation, also expects 
growth to drop.
• China is also looking vulnerable – facing major policy decisions
• Europe’s immediate neighborhood looks fragile and even 
explosive in parts.  
• North Africa is still unsettled and Turkey could suffer from financial 
contagion given its need for capital inflows. 
• Indebted emerging Europe is restive 30
EZ 2011 Austerity Packages
31
Slow-Down in Eastern Europe
32
Alternative Scenarios
There are several possible scenarios for the global economy. 
• Benign – Global growth picks up again before end of year 
Commodity prices stabilize and weaker inflation relieves 
pressure on consumers and central banks
• This boosts confidence in governments’ ability to manage their debts 
and encourages a rally in global equity markets
• Muddling Through – Economic activity remains subdued 
despite falling commodity prices and inflation. 
• The debt crisis escalates in the euro-area periphery and banking system 
sucking in Italy and requiring further fundraising by the European 
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and IMF.
• Double-Dip Recession – Growth slackens markedly in 
leading emerging market economies and the developed 
world slips back into recession. 
• Commodity prices tumble and threat of deflation reappears in some 
countries.  Tensions over sovereign debt and austerity policies cause 




Probably of stagnation or double dip scenario is higher (60%) than 
before (15-20% in the spring and 30-40% in July), as negative 
macroeconomic surprises and faltering confidence continue to  
show up in the data
• The slowdown is more than a soft patch, and policy makers 
(particularly in DMs) will find themselves without policy bullets or 
unwilling to use the ones they have
• Possible triggers include policy mistakes (or inadequate policy 
responses) or a major financing shock stemming from disorderly 
default by sovereigns or a systemic financial crisis
• The recovery remains policy dependent in DMs that are relying on 
ZIRP and withdrawing from fiscal stimulus packages.
• If DMs were to experience sharp demand destruction, EMs would 
suffer as real economic and financial links exacerbate the ongoing 
slowdown, though  most (especially in Asia and Latin America) 
have policy space for stimulus.  




In the medium term (five year horizon) a weak U-Shaped 
recovery amid balance sheet repair is the most likely 
scenario
• However given the macroeconomic deterioration, the 
political impasse in the United States and continued 
uncertainty in the EZ, the risk of falling into a protracted 
recession with inadequate policy responses is high (45%).
• As gradual deleveraging continues, investors will search for 
yield to maximize real returns, bringing capital to Ems as 
well as commodities, and adding to EM monetary trilemmas
• Regulatory changes encourage the buildup of leverage 
outside investment banks (in the shadow banking system) 
and in EMs with space to borrow more. 
• Although EMs like Brazil and Turkey still have low overall 
outstanding credit, debt-service costs could dampen 
consumption
• Slow policy normalizaion will plant the seeds in the next 
crisis in EMs and EMs.
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Possible Perfect Storm
Several coincident stresses raise short- and medium-term risks
• Amid U.S. cyclical slowdown, political gridlock stands in the way of 
necessary stimulus and reforms to deal with underlying 
vulnerabilities (e.g., the housing market).
• EZ policy makers are running out of time. Despite more significant 
moves from the European Commission/ECB, debt levels are still 
too high, raising the risk of a country exiting in the medium term.
• The end of the Chinese investment bubble is a medium term (post-
2013) risk, but DM recession could bring the risks forward. The 
end of China’s investment and lending binge will weigh on 
domestic and global growth.
• Global rebalancing has been insufficient .  Excess capacity could 
derail investment
• Governance Traps may halt growth in one or more Ems at a critical 
juncture – around per capita income $10,000 to $15,000.
• Sudden  and prolonged spike in oil prices -- Middle East conflict, 
terrorist attack on oil infrastructure could halt a major ripple 
effect.
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Part II Future Issues
• Likely Areas of Crisis/Instability 
• Eurozone Sovereign and Banking
• Chinese Economic Stresses
• Unrest Due to Globalization Stresses
• Unemployment Increased Inequality
• Budgetary Stress – Security Expenditures
• U.S. Fiscal Crisis
• Final Assessment
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Concern over Europe’s Future
Report of the Reflection Group on EU’s Future
• The report offers a pessimistic diagnosis of the problems facing the 
EU. Key challenges include:
• The global economic and financial crisis – impact on the Eurozone and 
Euro
• Ageing populations
• Downward pressure on costs and wages
• Climate change and increasing energy dependence
• An eastward shift in the global distribution of production and savings 
and
• The Union’s lack of international clout
• The report calls for the EU to become an assertive global actor to 
avoid sliding into marginalization, becoming an increasingly irrelevant 
western peninsula of the Asian continent.
• It highlights the gap between the EU’s capacities as a global economic 
actor and its lack of a common vision and voice in foreign policy.
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EMU Dilemmas 
Low competitiveness in the GIIPS countries presents a major dilemma 
and questions about the future of the Euro
• The usual fix, devaluation is not an option
• Must compete by pushing wages down – very unpopular
• Offered a choice between austerity and quitting the euro, voters would 
choose to leave monetary system
• Wage cuts might not work anyway
• If try to force wages down it means deflation and deflation increases the 
burden of their already sizeable debts
• Because of the debt-deflation pincer, uncompetitive and indebted 
countries must choose between default and leaving the euro.
• Greece with high-debts, and in a high wage trap will stay in only if 
other countries assume most of its debts. Europe together with the 
IMF can do this for Greece
• Moral hazard problem.  Bailed out investors will assume they can lend 
freely to other big spenders.
• What happens if a country larger than Greece falls in the same trap? 
By bailing out Greece, Europe may have only postponed the 
inevitable.
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Eurozone Political Economy Problem
Could the Eurozone Break Up? Possible over a Five-Year 
Horizon
• The current “muddle through” approach to the EZ crisis 
is not a stable disequilibrium; rather it is an unstable 
disequilibrium
• Either the member states move from this disequilibrium 
towards a broader fiscal, economic and poltical union 
that resolves the fundamental problems of divergence 
(both economically and fiscally and in terms of 
competiveness) within the union  B or
• The system will move first toward disorderly debt 
workouts and eventually breakup, with the weaker 
members departing.  Over a five year horizon, the odds of 
a breakup are about 40%.
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What Happens When a Country Defaults? I
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What Happens When a Country Defaults? II
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RGE EZ Scenario Analysis
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China: Crisis Lessons
The Chinese government has drawn some important 
conclusions from the economic crisis:
• The U.S. has ceased to be a model for China’s 
economic reforms – this has both economic and 
political consequences.
• The crisis has confirmed the government’s belief that 
the state should have a major role in the economy
• China is trying to reduce its dependence on Western 
consumer markets
• China will reduce economic imbalances but only 
slowly and on its own terms.
• This last factor in particular has helped heat-up the 
long-standing friction with the U.S. 
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China-US Economic Frictions 
• Disagreement between the two countries runs deep
• For three decades the US has granted China access to its consumer 
markets – enabled China to build up massive manufacturing capacity 
and export revenues
• Chinese have gained competitiveness not only through abundance of 
cheap labor but also by pegging their currency, the yuan to the US. 
Dollar at a weak rate 
• Exchange rate policy gives Chinese goods an advantage over its 
competitors – including U.S. producers
• The crisis has compounded tensions
• The global economic crisis left China with massive foreign exchange 
reserves from years of trade surpluses
• China continues to grow rapidly while the US suffers from prolonged 
unemployment of around 10% and a weakened manufacturing sector
• Hence US has begun to pressure China more aggressively to open up its 
markets  to U.S. goods and remove its fixed exchange rate advantage.
• China argues trade surpluses arise from other reasons 45
China’s Future
• Key questions for Chinese future scenarios:
• Can China implement internal reforms to further its 
development?
• How will China’s relationship with the rest of the world affect its 
development and shape the global context?
• A number of factors will influence how these questions are 
answered in the next several decades:
• The intent of China’s leadership and its ability to sustain the 
implementation of decisions made
• The economic policy choices made, including the degree of 
liberalization and openness
• The extent to which social stability can be maintained and 
popular expectations managed.
• The reaction of other global actors to China’s rise, and the 
broader geopolitical situation.
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Changing Center of World Economy
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Black Dots: 1980-2007; Red Dots: Projected 2011-2049
Chinese Slowdown Likely
48






2011 World – Wide Instability 
• Economic factors underlie many of the various 2011 protests:
• Arab Spring uprising and revolts
• Riots in England against pension cuts, higher tuition fees
• Israeli middle class protesting high housing prices and the squeeze from 
inflation
• Chilean students concerned abut education and jobs
• Vandalism of “fat cat” cars in Germany
• Greeks demonstrating against fiscal austerity
• India’s movement against corruption
• Deadly riots in china’s globally integrated eastern provinces in reaction 
to corruption, inequality and illegal land seizures
• Occupy Wall Street movement across U. S. 
• Protests don’t have a single unified theme, but express in different 
ways concerns of the working and middle classes about their 
economic futures
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Common Causes of Protest
• Some common causes of these protests are:
• Serious economic and financial insecurity and malaise among blue and 
white collar workers with the recent global financial crisis leading to a 
very weak recovery in advanced economies
• High rates of unemployment and underemployment in advanced and 
emerging economies
• A lack of skills and skills-mismatch preventing young people and 
workers from competing in a more globalized world economy
• Resentment against corruption, including “legalized forms” such as 
interest grouping using financial power of lobbying to pursue their 
narrow interests
• Poverty, insecurity, anger and hopelessness about the future and a 
desire for greater social justice;
• A sharp increase in income and wealth inequality in advanced 
economies and even fast growing emerging markets
• Many observers attribute capitalism and the recent acceleration in 
globalization as the root cause of these development
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Income Inequality in U.S.
54Note: % share of total income including capital gains
Income Share of Top 1%
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Inequality and Its Ramifications
• The recent increases in inequality are complex and cannot be 
attributed to one factor.  Causes include:
• The addition of 2.5 billion workers from China and India and another 
billion of other EM populations to the global labor force – reducing the 
jobs and wages of unskilled blue collar and of off-shorable white collar 
workers in advanced economies
• Skill based technological change – big gaps developing in incomes 
between college graduates and non-college workers
• Winner take all effects – globalization creates winners and losers.  
Recent winners have been capital and skilled workers in traded goods 
sectors. With competition and limited productivity growth in non-traded 
areas little wage growth.
• By 2010 the share of income of the top 15 by income was 23% 
having risen from 10% two decades earlier
• The top 5% control about 75% of financial wealth.
• Instability arises because the political ramifications of these 
developments are hard to predict – Populist governments? 
increased protectionism?  Trade wars?  Resource nationalizations? 
Internal conflicts?
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U. S. Fiscal Outlook
• After the debt ceiling conflict, further fiscal stimulus are 
unlikely at a time when the economy may be moving 
towards a recession.
• Only when it is clear the economy is in another downturn 
and it is too late to avoid one, the discussion abut 
stimulating the economy fiscally might resume
• Effective fiscal stimulus in the form of a jobs program, 
comprehensive support to stabilize the housing sector or 
infrastructure spending is less likely than some form of tax-
based stimulus that comes with a lower multiplier.
• A credible commitment to long-term fiscal consolidation 
needs to be made immediately; however front-loading the 
fiscal austerity does not make sense as the resulting fiscal 
drag would exacerbate the downturn.  The current path of 
policy  is the exact opposite of optimal.
• The necessary primary adjustment to prevent an eventual 
fiscal train wreck in the U.S. is 5.4% of GDP.  Some fiscal 




Crisis Impact on Defense Spending
Global financial crisis and the subsequent recession in most 
European countries has created a new dynamic for defense 
spending
• Even before the crisis punishing demands of operations on 
armed forces revealed shortfalls in capabilities
• In addition the cost of new equipment was rising at a rate of 5-
10% per year.
• As both trends continue, European governments now 
struggling to control public deficits have launched a series of 
austerity measures across the board.
• In the overall scheme of government priorities, defense 
spending has become discretionary and many defense 
ministers have already been asked to make do with less money
• Two basic options in light of these developments
• Accept that reduced financial resources will lead to reduced capabilities
• Use the budget crunch as an opportunity to do things differently
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Defense and Austerity
• Most elements of defense policy are likely to experience major 
changes.
• UK government has suggested defense expenditures might be 
cut between 10% and 25% over the next few years
• France is considering cuts of $2.6-$6.6 billion over the next three 
years.
• Germany – Finance Ministry has demanded reductions totaling 
4.3 billion Euros for the period 2011-14.
• Italy and Span have slashed budgets as have a range of smaller 
EU member states.
• So far these cuts have not been coordinated on the European 
level which increases the likelihood that an overall reduction of 
European capability will be the result
• In late July 2010 France and Germany were first countries to 
announce coordinated discussions about cuts.
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Patterns of Military Expenditures
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Projected Changes in Defense Budgets: 2010-2015
62
CBO Defense Budget Estimates
63
Is Health Care the Worst Threat to U.S. National Security?
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The Special Joint Committee
U.S. Legislation passed on August 2, 2011 sets up a Special 
Joint Committee that must identify $1.5 trillion additional 
deficit reductions by the end of 2011
• If the Congress does not support its proposals, this would 
trigger automatic deficit reductions of $1.2 trillion to 
defense and non-defense programs equally by 2013
• The Special Joint committee must address the cuts that should be made 
in U.S. national security efforts by November 23, 2011 by a simple 
majority vote
• The Congress must complete up or down votes by December 23, 2011
• If the Special Joint Committee’s recommendations are not 
accepted, the bill would trigger massive cuts that would 
apply to a broad  national security category, including the 
Department of Defense
• It also sets annual caps in budget authority for this security 
category of $546 billion if the Special Joint Committee’s 
recommendations are not past into law or are vetoes, and 
requires OMB to enforce them.
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Implications for U.S. Security
One key outcome of the Crisis – Lower Growth and Higher debt –
Greater Threat to Security than Concerns at Start of Crisis
• Financial constraints will play a considerable role in structuring 
U.S. policy in the foreseeable future
• When debt levels reach 90% or more of GDP, the U.S. may find 
that its rate of growth slows by 1% per year (ring of fire 
diagram)
• The fiscal squeeze that the U.S. and other advanced economies 
may experience can have the ability to crowd out discretionary 
spending – defense budgets under considerable stress.
• As a result the ability for advanced countries such as the U.S. 
to spend increasing shares of GDP on defense and security 
may ---- even to respond to threats may be extremely limited.
• In the longer term the U.S. is likely to find that its traditional 
allies are declining in relative economic and military strength.
• Similarly, the U.S. will find it has to deal more and more with 





• The global economy has been significantly affected by the 
financial crisis
• Emerging economies will outpace the growth of the 
advanced economies. This disparity in growth has only been 
exacerbated by the financial crisis
• If commodity prices increase over the next several years it 
would further reduce slow DMs and perhaps some EMs
• Debt will rise and revenues will fall for the governments of 
advanced economies while emerging economies will be 
more fiscally sound
• U.S. and other DM countries will most likely experience a 
lower rate economic growth than it has in the past creating 
greater fiscal stresses
• The fiscal stress in the advanced economies may 




• Thank You ---
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